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The Constitutionally Tamed Force
Throughout history, military force has been considered a guarantor of state
sovereignty. Due to the autonomous organisational structures of the military and
the penetrating power of military force, it has gained a special position within
the states’ entire apparatus, and has been used throughout history as a tool to
enforce political interests. With the rise of parliamentary democracies in the frame
of constitutionalism the control over, and the limitation of, the use of executive state
power have become essential. Thus, as military force became embodied in such a
constitutional frame, the rule-of-law-control mechanisms became applicable to the
use of military force as clearly assignable to the executive branch of state powers.
The actual extent as to which modern constitutional states regulate the deployment
of their military might be, apart from all rule-of-law considerations, influenced by
the general attitude of the democratic society towards its own military culture. The
basic acceptance, however, also by the military itself, that the use of military force on
behalf of the constitutional state must be constrained, and that the military is obliged
under the constitution to act legitimately in accordance to the given law, including
human rights, is a major accomplishment of the modern constitutional state.
Moreover, as an execution of state power, the use of military force has become
subject to legal accountability and judicial review by civilian courts. However,
deviations from a strict rule-of-frame do occur. This is obvious when the military
is deployed as an executive instrument in a state of emergency such as war, and
on top of this, outside of the state’s own territory. The regime of the ius in bello, if
applicable, follows a different rationale than that of the national legal regime applying
to the limitation of the exercise of force.
The use of military power as ultima ratio does not need to stand the same strict
proportionality test as is required for any other use of executive state power (e.g.
the police). It only needs to be not excessive. The political question doctrine is
also more likely to be invoked and limit the judicial review of military acts, and also
the application of state liability principles for wrongful acts is more limited in scope
(cp. e.g. the Kunduz-Case, BGH, 06.10.2016 – III ZR 140/15). Nevertheless, it
is generally accepted that the execution of military force, also within the frame
of international cooperation, needs to comply with rule of law standards. Here,
a common ground needs to be determined. One which allows for effective
military cooperation, but still follows a set of accepted rules and complies with the
sovereignty reservations of the states involved.
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The Exercise of Military Force in the EU Context
As an entity „sui generis“, the EU is founded on the values of respect for human
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.
These values are common to the Member States (cp. Art. 2 TEU) and also apply to
their military forces regardless of the different military cultures of the Member States
(e.g. France, Great Britain and Germany). Within this frame, a directly applicable
supranational legal order with primacy over the national law and a judicial review
system has been created.
Art. 42 para. 5 TEU indicates the frame of EU military cooperation: The Council may
entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member
States in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests. It needs to
be stressed, however, that so far, the Member States have not transferred further
law-making competences in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP) to the European Union, as it is, for example, more obviously the case
regarding some other policy fields in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
also aiming at classical executive state powers (cp. e.g. the Schengen Border
Code, Regulation (EU) 2018/1240). It remains, in particular, the national decision
of the states, whether or not, and to what extent, they wish to cooperate (e.g. by
establishing a permanent structured cooperation with other Member States, cp. Art.
42 para 6 TEU), and whether or not they wish to participate in EU missions, that still
need an international mandate as a legal basis, too, at all. The integration of military
cooperation is far less advanced than, e.g. in the case of the Integrated Border
Management (Art. 77 TFEU).
The intergovernmental component based on international law principles remains
quite strong in this policy field. Moreover, the European Court of Justice shall not
have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the common foreign and
security policy nor with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions
(Art. 275 TFEU). However, the Council appears as a key decision-making body
with regard to launching EU military missions, and determining the structural details
(command and control). And a Council decision is – as an actual legal act of the EU
– binding for the Member States. This certainly raises the question on which level
of the multi-level legal system effective rule-of-protection mechanisms are in fact
embedded.
What goes around, comes around
In 2012 the German Administrative Court in Cologne (VG Köln, 25 K 4280/09)
had to decide about a complaint for declaratory judgment as provided for in the
German Administrative Courts Procedure. It would have been business as usual if
it was not for the multi-level legal setting of the case. The claim against the Federal
Republic of Germany was brought by an alleged Somalian pirate who was detained
in the Golf of Aden by a German military ship and later handed-over to Kenyan
authorities for prosecution. The plaintiff claimed that his detention was illegitimate
and violated his right to fair trail. The German military ship was part of the EU-
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led Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) operating in the frame of the EU-military mission
ATALANTA launched by a EU Council decision based on a UN-Security Council
resolution.
Interestingly, while usually the sovereignty argument remains strong within the
Common Defence Policy, and keeping control over the own military force remains
crucial, the German government argued, in fact, that it was the wrong party to the
case. The detention of the plaintiff and his handing-over to the Kenyan administration
by the German military members was, Germany argued, not an act of German state
power. The military forces did not act on behalf of Germany, but as the supranational
EUNAVAL-FORCE (EUNAVFOR) under the operational command of the EU.
The administrative court struck down this argument by applying international law
accountability standards created by the European Court of Human Rights (e.g. case
Behrami). However, if the court had evaluated the “effective operational control”
level of the EU differently, it would not have had jurisdiction over the case due to the
lack of executive power held by the German state. However, neither would have the
European Court of Justice. The Appellative Administrative Court, therefore, took a
different argumentative approach (OVG NRW, 4 A 2948/11). It identified the act as a
case of the execution of EU law and applied the mechanism of legal protection that
is recognised in this regard: Acts of Member States executing EU law are subject to
judicial review by national courts of the Member States.
Indeed, such an approach provides more predictability and limits the possibility
of a loophole in the rule-of-law protection system, which can occur in cases of
international military cooperation under the umbrella of an international organisation
such as the UN, when the „effective operational control“ lies with the international
organisation, and not with the state providing its military forces. It overlooks,
however, the fact that the use of military force within an EU launched military
mission is not exactly the same situation as the execution of an EU regulation by the
administration of the Member States.
Generally speaking, the case proves the commitment to the rule of law and shows
the tendency to allocate the rule-of-law-protection mechanism in the context of
supranational military cooperation on the national, rather the supranational level. The
case is, however, also a paradigmatic example of the open questions regarding the
execution of military force under the rule of law and within the supranational, multi-
level umbrella of the EU, particularly, if the emphasis between the national and the
supranational shall shift.
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